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ESSAY
RETHINKING THEFT CRIMES IN VIRGINIA
John G. Douglass *
"History has its own logic."'
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the law of theft, our English ancestors did us
no favors. They left us the separate crimes of larceny, embezzle-
ment, and false pretenses. They drew a thin line between larceny
and embezzlement, a line that can shift depending upon the mo-
ment in time a thief decides to steal.2 They distinguished larceny
from false pretense based on elusive concepts of "title."3 As if
these formal distinctions weren't challenge enough, the common
law courts concocted legal fictions like "constructive possession"
to turn apparent embezzlements into larcenies and vice versa.4
The result is a nightmare for prosecutors. An indictment may
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1977, Dartmouth
College; J.D., 1980, Harvard Law School.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. b (1962). For a more complete recounting of the
historical development of theft law, see George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny,
89 HARv. L. REV. 469 (1976).
2. See The King v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 (1779).
3. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 8.7(a), at 828 (3d ed. 2000).
4. "[E]xcept in very early stages of the common law, possession has sometimes been
more and sometimes less than what meets the eye." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 3-9 (1978).
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charge one form of theft, while proof at trial suggests a different
form. A conviction can hang in the balance.5
Over the last fifty years, most American jurisdictions6-not to
mention the English themselves'-have simplified their criminal
codes by consolidating larceny, embezzlement, and false pre-
tenses into a single offense called "theft." Virginia is not among
them. Instead, Virginia has tried to address the problem with a
procedural device. In various forms for most of the last century,
the Code of Virginia has provided that proof of embezzlement or
false pretenses would suffice to sustain a charge of larceny.' In
theory at least, this procedural solution prevented a thief from
escaping conviction simply because a prosecutor miscalculated in
framing an indictment.9 But it created a new problem. A defen-
dant might go through a trial, and sometimes even an appeal,
without knowing the elements of his alleged crime. The unfair-
ness of that process is obvious. Virginia courts have responded by
reversing convictions whenever prosecutors sought to convict for
a theft crime different than the one charged. ° As a result, the
prosecutors' dilemma has never really gone away.
This year's Annual Survey comes at a critical time in the evolu-
tion of Virginia's theft law. Events of the past year highlight the
dilemma that Virginia's theft law creates for both prosecutors and
defendants. Last November, in Commonwealth v. Bruhn,1 the
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the 1994 amendments to
the Virginia Code eliminated Virginia's permissive indictment
5. Casebooks and treatises are filled with cases where defendants successfully
avoided conviction by arguing that the proof at trial established a theft crime, but not the
crime charged. Professor LaFave describes such cases as "a favorite indoor sport played for
high stakes in our appellate courts." LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.8, at 846.
6. John Wesley Bartram, Pleading for Theft Consolidation in Virginia: Larceny, Em-
bezzlement, False Pretenses and § 19.2-284, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 249, 251 n.23 (1999).
7. Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, § 1(1) (Eng.).
8. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
9. I say "in theory" for two reasons. First, for most of the last century, Virginia's
permissive indictment rule has been tempered by an "election" provision allowing defen-
dants to demand that the Commonwealth elect a particular form of theft offense in writing
before trial. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 1981); see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 80-82. Second, despite the procedural rule allowing proof of embezzlement to
sustain a larceny indictment, Virginia courts have continued to reverse convictions where
the proof at trial showed a different crime than the theft alleged in the indictment. See,
e.g., Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 194-95, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Baker, 225 Va. at 194-95, 300 S.E.2d at 789.
11. 264 Va. 597, 570 S.E.2d 866 (2002).
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procedure in theft cases.12 Proof of embezzlement, the court ruled,
cannot sustain a conviction under an indictment for larceny.
13
Months earlier, the en banc Court of Appeals of Virginia reached
the same conclusion,14 while adding a constitutional dimension. It
would violate both the Virginia and the United States Constitu-
tions, the court wrote, to allow conviction for a theft offense dif-
ferent from the offense alleged in the indictment. 5 In February
2003, the General Assembly of Virginia responded by rewriting
the permissive indictment procedure into Virginia law. 6 The
amended Virginia Code provides that proof of embezzlement will
sustain a conviction under a larceny indictment.1 7 But the new
provision ignores the constitutional problem highlighted by the
court of appeals in Bruhn. It allows trial courts to convict for
crimes not charged in an indictment, and appellate courts to sus-
tain verdicts never rendered by trial courts. The statute, which
went into effect on July 1, 2003, has yet to be tested in Virginia's
appellate courts. Odds are, it will not survive constitutional scru-
tiny.
In sum, despite the efforts of the General Assembly, Virginia
law remains stuck between the "rock" of antiquated theft crimes
and the "hard place" of due process. Tinkering with procedural
rules merely masks the real problem. My aim in this article is to
suggest a different approach." It is time to address the substan-
tive definition of theft crimes in Virginia: to consolidate the
crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses-as most
other American jurisdictions have done"9-into a single offense.
12. Id. at 602, 570 S.E.2d at 869.
13. Id.
14. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537, 546, 559 S.E.2d 880, 885 (Ct. App.
2002).
15. See id. at 541, 559 S.E.2d at 882 (relying on Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
220, 231, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992)).
16. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
18. I say "different," rather than "new," because consolidation of theft offenses is not a
new idea. It is a century-old solution to a three-hundred-year-old problem. For accounts of
the movement toward theft consolidation, see generally JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1031-33 (4th ed. 2000); LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.8, at 846-
51; LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS 413-17 (7th ed.
2003). For a more recent discussion of the need for consolidation in Virginia, see Bartram,
supra note 6.
19. See Bartram, supra note 6, at 251 n.23.
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By dealing with substance rather than procedure, we can elimi-
nate historical distinctions which serve only to confound prosecu-
tors and complicate criminal litigation. And we can do so without
sacrificing the rights of defendants.
II. A LEGACY FROM THE BRITISH: A CONFUSING
TANGLE OF THEFT OFFENSES
Virginia defines the principal theft crimes of larceny, embez-
zlement, and false pretenses essentially as they were defined at
common law and by the Eighteenth Century British Parliament."
The narrow, technical distinctions among these crimes have chal-
lenged courts and confounded prosecutors for centuries.21
A. Distinguishing Larceny and Embezzlement
In Virginia, larceny and embezzlement remain separate of-
fenses with different elements.22 Larceny requires a wrongful tak-
ing of property from the victim's possession.23 Embezzlement oc-
curs where the defendant lawfully obtains possession, then
wrongfully converts the property.24 Because, by definition, one
20. See infra text accompanying notes 26-62. The Virginia Code adopts the common
law definition for larceny simply by using the term "larceny" without further explanation
in the statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-95 to -96 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (defining grand and
petit larceny, respectively); see also Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 468, 474, 452
S.E.2d 687, 691 (Ct. App. 1995). Separate statutes define embezzlement, VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003), and false pretenses, id. § 18.2-178 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
21. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.8, at 846. As Justice Moncure stated:
The crimes... are so much alike in many respects and often separated by
lines so indistinct, and almost imaginary, that it was difficult for the prosecu-
tor, in most cases, to determine, a priori, which particular crime to charge in
the indictment, and it very often happened that the proof made out a differ-
ent crime from the one charged.., and the consequence was that the accused
had to be acquitted, though in fact guilty of a more aggravated crime than the
one charged against him.
Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 580 (1873) (Moncure, J., dissenting).
22. Smith v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 646, 649, 283 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1981); Gwaltney,
19 Va. App. at 474, 452 S.E.2d at 690-91. (Ct. App. 1995); Cera v. Commonwealth, No.
0432-94-4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 407, at *6 (Ct. App. May 2, 1995) (unpublished decision)
("[E]mbezzlement and larceny are separate offenses with different elements.").
23. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 339, 343-44, 544 S.E.2d 895, 897 (Ct. App.
2001), affd en banc, 37 Va. App. 537, 559 S.E.2d 880 (Ct. App. 2002), affd, 264 Va. 597,
570 S.E.2d 866 (2002); Gwaltney, 19 Va. App. at 474, 452 S.E.2d at 690-91; Jones v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 295, 301, 349 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (Ct. App. 1986).
24. Smith, 222 Va. at 649, 283 S.E.2d at 210.
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cannot simultaneously be guilty of lawfully obtaining possession
and wrongfully obtaining possession, the crimes do not overlap.
One who commits larceny is not guilty of embezzling the same
property, and vice versa.2"
The distinction between the offenses is a product of history. At
common law, the crime of larceny was originally designed to pre-
vent breaches of the peace occurring when property was forcibly
taken from its rightful holder.26 As a result, the crime focused on
possession rather than ownership. 27 Over time, the crime ex-
panded to cover takings by stealth and by "trick," but the essence
of larceny remained the same: the wrongful taking of tangible
property from possession of the owner. Virginia law inherited
that basic limit, and adheres to it today. Larceny requires a tak-
ing from "possession."2 And it applies only to tangible personal
property, the kind that can be-literally, physically-possessed.29
As English commerce grew in scale and sophistication, the lim-
its of common law larceny soon became apparent, especially in
cases involving thefts from employers. If an employer voluntarily
delivered his property to an employee, the employer gave up
physical possession. ° When the employee later misappropriated
the property, there was no wrongful taking from the employer's
possession, no "trespass in the taking," and, hence, no larceny."
To cover this gap, common law courts created the legal fiction
that the employer retained "constructive possession" when he
gave only temporary "custody" of the property to the employee.32
When the employee then misappropriated the property, he took
from the owner's constructive possession and committed lar-
ceny.33
25. This fact alone eliminates the expedient of indicting for both larceny and embez-
zlement in a close case. Logically, a grand jury cannot find probable cause for both crimes
at once. See infra text at Part TV.D.
26. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1(a), at 791.
27. ROGER D. GROOT, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN VIRGINIA 334 (4th ed.
1998).
28. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. at 344, 544 S.E.2d at 897; Jones, 3 Va. App.
at 301, 349 S.E.2d at 418 ("To constitute the crime of simple larceny, there must have been
a felonious taking of the property from the possession of the owner. .. ").
29. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 691-92, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977).
30. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.8(a), at 792.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Outside of the employment relationship, English courts found
mere custody rather than possession in a variety of contexts. A
bailee given control of property in a closed container, for example,
was deemed to possess the container, but to have mere custody of
the contents.34 One who took by fraud obtained mere custody, not
possession, and thus committed larceny when he sold or con-
verted the property to his own use.35
Virginia courts inherited, and continue to apply, the same fic-
tional doctrine of constructive possession. In Overstreet v. Com-
monwealth,36 for example, the court held that a defendant who
had been given permission to drive a car committed larceny of the
vehicle when he kept it beyond the time consented to by the
owner." The court stated, "where the owner gives consent to a
temporary possession or a possession for a limited purpose, the
expiration of that qualification creates a constructive revestment
of possession in the true owner."
3
Over time, the doctrine of constructive possession simply cre-
ated new line-drawing problems.39 The English courts never ap-
plied it to all employees, bailees, and others who received prop-
erty with consent of the owner. As one commentator notes, the
terms "possession" and "custody" really "represent legal conclu-
sions regarding the comparative rights of the parties; there is no
bright-line point at which the degree of control over property
shifts from custody to possession." For prosecutors, the problem
can be especially acute at the time of indictment. The difference
between custody and possession, and therefore the difference be-
tween larceny and embezzlement, may turn on the details of a
poorly documented understanding between the owner and the de-
fendant.
The fiction of constructive possession filled some, but not all,
gaps in common law larceny. The doctrine did not apply where a
third party-like a bank depositor-delivered property to an em-
34. Carrier's Case, Y.B. 13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, pl. 5 (1473).
35. The King v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 (1779).
36. 17 Va. App. 234, 435 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1993).
37. Id. at 238, 435 S.E.2d at 909.
38. Id. at 236, 435 S.E.2d at 908.
39. See GROOT, supra note 27, at 185 (noting that distinctions based on constructive
possession by employers have become "much blurred in Virginia").
40. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 511 (2d ed. 1995).
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ployee under circumstances where the employee was obligated to
turn the property over to his employer.4' In such cases, common
law courts reasoned, the employer could not retain "constructive
possession" because he never had possession of the property to
begin with." Without the employer's possession, actual or con-
structive, there could be no larceny.4" The landmark Bazeley's
Case" established this rule two centuries ago. There, a bank clerk
received a customer's money for deposit into the bank.45 He put
the money in his pocket rather than into the bank's cash
drawer. 6 The court held that such evidence was insufficient to
prove larceny, because the bank had never obtained possession of
the money.4
Bazeley's Case led to the first embezzlement statute, passed by
Parliament in 1799."s In effect, Bazeley's Case and that 1799 stat-
ute established the basic distinction between the separate crimes
of larceny and embezzlement, a distinction that-with minor
modification-prevails in Virginia today.49 Virginia, by statute,
defines embezzlement to include all conversions of property which
a defendant "received for another" or "which shall have been en-
trusted or delivered to him.""
The element of "entrustment," just like the doctrine of con-
structive possession, leads to hair-splitting issues in close cases.
In Gwaltney v. Commonwealth,5 for example, a bank teller stole
not from her own cash drawer, but from the momentarily unat-
tended drawer of another teller.52 Gwaltney argued that her
crime was larceny, not embezzlement, because she had never
41. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1(b), at 793.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799). For a more detailed account of Bazeley's Case and its
role in defining the difference between common law larceny and embezzlement, see
LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1(b), at 793-94.
45. Bazeley's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. at 517-18.
46. Id. at 518.
47. Id. at 523-24.
48. 39 Geo. 3, c. 85 (1799); see also LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1(b), at 794 n.10.
49. In Virginia, the embezzlement statute may sweep more broadly than its English
antecedents. See Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 468, 474-75, 452 S.E.2d 687,
691 (Ct. App. 1995). But the statute still applies only to theft offenses "which fall outside
the common law definition of larceny." Id. at 475, 452 S.E.2d at 691.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
51. 19 Va. App. 468, 475, 452 S.E.2d 687, 691 (1995).
52. Id. at 470, 452 S.E.2d at 689.
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been entrusted with the particular currency that she stole.53 The
court ruled otherwise, finding that "Gwaltney's position of trust
extended beyond the confines of her station to the entire teller
line." Gwaltney is one of several Virginia cases that demonstrate
the troublesome dilemma a prosecutor may face in choosing the
appropriate charge for an indictment alleging theft by an em-
ployee.5 Employment relationships involve an endless variety of
rules and practices that may, or may not, result in the entrust-
ment of particular property to a particular employee. Determin-
ing how far an employee's "position of trust" extends may require
analysis and investigation that, as a practical matter, few police
officers and prosecutors are able to undertake before indictment.
Conflicting rules or differences of opinion among managers within
an employing company may make it impossible to prove entrust-
ment-or lack thereof-beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, that is
what Virginia law currently requires.
B. Distinguishing Larceny and False Pretenses
Like embezzlement, the crime of false pretenses was created by
the British Parliament to fill a gap in the common law crime of
larceny.56 At common law, one who gained possession of property
by fraud was guilty of larceny "by trick."57 A thief who succeeded
in gaining both possession and title to property, however, was
guilty of no offense at all."8 Parliament responded to that loophole
with a 1757 statute making it a crime to "obtain" property by
"false pretense."59 Despite the ambiguity of the term "obtain,"
both the original English version and the many similar American
statutes have been construed to require passage of title as an
element of the offense.6" Virginia's statute and interpretive case
53. Id. at 473, 452 S.E.2d at 690.
54. Id. at 475, 452 S.E.2d at 691.
55. For a comparison of those close cases, see GROOT, supra note 27, at 185, 196 nn.
13-14 (comparing Simmons v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 181, 247 S.E.2d 359 (1978); Foster
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 326, 163 S.E.2d 601 (1968); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va.
233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958); and Walker v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 743 (1837)).
56. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.7(a), at 828.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 30 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1757); see also LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.7(a), at 828-29.
60. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.7(d), at 834.
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law follow that tradition.61 In essence, then, false pretenses con-
sists of obtaining title to property by fraud. It requires: (1) a false
statement of fact; that (2) causes the victim; (3) to pass title to the
defendant. The defendant must: (4) know his statement is false;
and (5) thereby intend to defraud the victim. 62
The main challenge in distinguishing larceny by trick from the
crime of false pretenses is determining whether title passed to the
thief. In Baker v. Commonwealth,63 for example, the defendant
took a Jeep from a car dealer for a "test drive," leaving behind as
security a truck he had fraudulently obtained elsewhere.64 After
he failed to return the Jeep, Baker was prosecuted for false pre-
tenses.65 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction
because title to the Jeep never passed to Baker.66 Baker's crime
was larceny, not false pretenses.67 Identifying the crime in Baker
is relatively easy, because vehicles come with paper titles issued
by the state. In many cases, however, passage of title raises more
intricate problems. Where a thief fraudulently obtains consumer
goods in a retail transaction, his crime typically will satisfy the
elements of false pretenses because Virginia's commercial code
deems title to pass upon delivery of the goods.6' But his crime
may be larceny if the small print of a consumer financing contract
leaves title with the retailer.69 In one Virginia case, the line be-
tween false pretenses and larceny turned upon a phrase in a
rental contract that required return of keys at the end of the
rental period.7" Even in cases involving cash, the line-drawing
problem may not be easy. Typically, title to currency passes with
61. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Cum. Supp. 2003); see also Baker v. Common-
wealth, 225 Va. 192, 194, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983).
62. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.7, at 828.
63. 225 Va. 192, 300 S.E.2d 788 (1983).
64. Id. at 194, 300 S.E.2d at 789.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Although it was clear on these facts that Baker had committed larceny, the court
declined to affirm the conviction on that ground. Id. The court noted, "[wihere, as here, the
Commonwealth elects to prosecute a defendant for a specific category of larceny, and no
other, its case must either prevail or fail upon that election." Id.
68. See Davies v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 350, 353, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ct. App.
1992); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (providing that title passes to the
buyer upon delivery of the goods "unless otherwise explicitly agreed").
70. See Bray v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 417, 425, 388 S.E.2d 837, 841 (Ct. App.
1990) (finding that "[o]wnership to the key does not pass to a tenant but is merely an ac-
cessory to the lease...").
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possession; but it may be otherwise where the victim places con-
ditions on the use of the cash or uses cash as security in a more
complex transaction.7 In such cases, the line between false pre-
tenses and larceny may depend upon what the victim said, or
thought, at the time of the crime. In sum, to be confident that
false pretenses is the right charge in some close cases, a prosecu-
tor must be a commercial law expert and a mind reader rolled
into one.
III. THE LEGACY OF PITSNOGLE: VIRGINIA SEEKS A PROCEDURAL
SOLUTION TO A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM
The complexities of theft law can mean that a guilty thief es-
capes conviction because a prosecutor miscalculates in crafting an
indictment. For decades, Virginia courts and legislators have
struggled to avoid that consequence, even while clinging to the
substantive law that causes the problem.
A. The Procedural Solution: Removing the Connection Between
Indictment and Proof
In 1847-48, the General Assembly enacted statutes providing
that one who embezzles, takes by false pretense, or receives sto-
len property "shall be deemed guilty of larceny."72 The 1847-48
legislation, according to one of its principal authors, "abolishes
[the] distinctive features [that separate larceny and other theft
crimes] and declares that the offenders shall be deemed guilty of
stealing, taking and carrying away the property."73
If merely "deeming" one crime to be another really meant that
the "distinctive features" had been eliminated, then the 1847-48
legislation would have resulted in substantive consolidation of
theft crimes in Virginia. But that is not what happened. Despite
the 1847-48 statute, subsequent judicial rulings in larceny cases
71. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.7, at 837.
72. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. 4, 1847-48 Va. Acts 99; see also Anable v. Common-
wealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 577 (1873).
73. Anable, 65 Va. (24 Gratt), at 581 (Moncure, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Moncure notes that he "was a member of the legislature which framed the criminal code."
Id. at 583.
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continued to insist on a trespassory taking from possession;74 the
embezzlement statute still required entrustment;7 ' and false pre-
tenses cases never abandoned the requirement that title must
pass.76 In other words, Virginia's Code and its courts continued to
define the three principal theft crimes as separate offenses with
different elements, even though the same Virginia Code said all
were "deemed" larceny.77
Instead of consolidating theft offenses as a matter of substance,
a line of supreme court decisions from 1852 to 1895 treated the
1847-48 statute as a procedural device that allowed a prosecutor
to indict for larceny and still convict for a different form of theft.
In Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth,8 the court summarized that view:
[U]pon an indictment simply charging larceny the Commonwealth
may show either that the subject of the larceny was received with a
knowledge that it was stolen, or that it was obtained by a false token
or false pretence [sic], or that it was embezzled.
79
B. Chipping Away at the Procedural Solution: The 1919 and 1994
Amendments and Commonwealth v. Bruhn
In 1919 the General Assembly codified that procedural device.
It amended the embezzlement statute to provide that one who
committed embezzlement "may be indicted as for simple larceny,
but proof of embezzlement ... shall be sufficient to sustain the
charge.""° But what the legislature gave with one hand it took
away with the other. The same 1919 amendment inserted an
"election" provision into the embezzlement statute, requiring the
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 295, 301, 349 S.E.2d 414, 417-18
(Ct. App. 1986).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003); see also Smith v. Commonwealth,
222 Va. 646, 649, 283 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 194, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983)
(holding that the passage of title is an essential element of larceny).
77. In Cera v. Commonwealth, No. 0432-94-4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 407 (Ct. App.
1995) (unpublished decision), it was the Commonwealth that insisted the offenses were
separate and distinct in order to avoid a speedy trial claim that arose when Cera was ar-
rested and given a preliminary hearing on an embezzlement charge, but later direct-
indicted and convicted for grand larceny. See id. at *4.
78. 91 Va. 808, 22 S.E. 351 (1895).
79. Id. at 811, 22 S.E. at 352.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 4451 (1919); see also Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537,
548, 559 S.E.2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 2002) (en banc) (Bumgardner, J., dissenting) (quoting
revisors' note to 1919 amendments).
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Commonwealth-upon timely demand from the defense-to spec-
ify the form of theft crime it intended to prove at trial.1
What had begun in 1847 as an attempt to eliminate "distinctive
features" among theft offenses had done nothing of the sort. The
distinctions remained. Even the procedural device of allowing the
Commonwealth to indict for one theft crime and prove another
had been watered down. The 1919 election provision merely
shifted to the defense the initial burden to ask for specificity.
Once the Commonwealth elected its charge, it was bound by its
own election."2
That state of affairs remained until 1994, when the General
Assembly amended the embezzlement statute in four critical
ways. 3 First, the 1994 amendment removed the language that
said one who commits the elements of embezzlement "shall be
deemed guilty of larceny. "84 Second, it removed the language al-
lowing an embezzler to be indicted "as for larceny" and removed
the phrase permitting proof of embezzlement to sustain a larceny
indictment.8 " The third change, removal of the election provi-
sion, 6 followed naturally. Once the permissive indictment proce-
dure was removed, there would be no need for an election. In ef-
fect, the indictment itself was now the election of a specific form
of theft charge. The Commonwealth would have to prove the
charge in the indictment. Fourth and finally, the 1994 amend-
ment added a sentence which said: "Embezzlement shall be
deemed larceny and upon conviction thereof, the person shall be
punished as provided in § 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96 (the grand and
petit larceny statutes)."" The final sentence-"[embezzlement
shall be deemed larceny"88 -carried the hint of theft consolida-
tion. But the placement of that language in the sentence prescrib-
ing the penalty for embezzlement, rather than in the sentence de-
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 4451 (1919).
82. Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 194, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983).
83. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 555, 1994 Va. Acts 776 (formerly codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Repl. Vol. 1996)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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fining the offense, suggested a different purpose. It meant only
that the penalties for larceny and embezzlement were the same.
8 9
Commonwealth v. Bruhn9" gave Virginia appellate courts their
first opportunity to interpret the 1994 amendments. Bruhn was
an employee of a small cabinet-making business.91 He refinished
some furniture for an acquaintance and received payment by
check.92 The employer later learned the details of the transaction
and claimed the money belonged to the business, not to Bruhn
personally.93 Bruhn was charged with grand larceny and con-
victed in a bench trial.9 4 On appeal, both the Court of Appeals of
Virginia95 and the Supreme Court of Virginia96 found the evidence
insufficient to prove larceny for the simple reason that Bruhn
took no tangible property from his employer's possession. The
Commonwealth argued that the permissive indictment rule of
Pitsnogle had survived the 1994 amendments and, therefore, that
proof of embezzlement still would suffice to sustain the larceny
charge against Bruhn." Both the Court of Appeals of Virginia 98
and the Supreme Court of Virginia99 disagreed. The 1994 amend-
ment had removed the provision allowing the Commonwealth to
indict for larceny and prove embezzlement, both courts ruled. 100
Pitsnogle was dead. The Commonwealth was bound to prove the
charge in the indictment and not some other form of theft.
89. Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. 597, 602-03, 570 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (quot-
ing Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537, 546, 559 S.E.2d 880, 885 (Ct. App. 2002)
(en banc)).
90. 264 Va. 597, 570 S.E.2d 866 (2002). In the interest of full disclosure, I should ac-
knowledge that I was co-counsel for Bruhn throughout his appeals.
91. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. at 341, 544 S.E.2d at 896.
92. Id. at 342, 544 S.E.2d at 896.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 342-43, 544 S.E.2d at 897.
95. Id. at 344, 544 S.E.2d at 897, affd 37 Va. App. 537, 540, 559 S.E.2d 880, 882 (Ct.
App. 2002) (en banc).
96. Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. at 603, 570 S.E.2d at 869.
97. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. at 344, 544 S.E.2d at 897.
98. Id. 344-46, 544 S.E.2d at 897-98, affd 37 Va. App. at 540-47, 559 S.E.2d at 882-
85 (Ct. App. 2002) (en banc).
99. Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. at 602-03, 570 S.E.2d at 869.
100. Id.; Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. at 345-46, 544 S.E.2d at 898.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
C. The 2003 Amendment: One More Try at a Procedural "Fix"
The General Assembly responded quickly. Within months it
passed House Bill 1454, which amended Virginia Code section
18.2-111, the same embezzlement statute at issue in Bruhn.10 1
The amendment provided:
Proof of embezzlement shall be sufficient to sustain the charge of
larceny. Any person convicted hereunder shall be deemed guilty of
larceny and may be indicted as for larceny and upon conviction shall
be punished as provided in §18.2-95 or 18.2-96.
l10
The 2003 amendment replaced the permissive indictment pro-
cedure that had been removed from the statute in 1994, but with
one major difference. The new statute has no election provision." 3
Today, a defendant facing a larceny indictment has no statutory
right to demand that the Commonwealth specify the theft offense
it intends to prove at trial.0 4 In effect, the 2003 General Assem-
bly turned back the clock on theft crimes not just to 1994, but all
the way to 1895.
IV. THE 2003 LEGISLATION VIOLATES THE VIRGINIA AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS
The 2003 amendment aims to solve a serious problem: convic-
tions lost where proof at trial fails to match the theft offense
stated in the indictment. But it creates a constitutional problem.
If Virginia prosecutors rely on the 2003 amendment, they are
likely to lose convictions on a variety of constitutional grounds.
By sanctioning a procedure that permits indictment for one crime
to support conviction of a different crime with different elements,
the 2003 amendment violates a defendant's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of a criminal charge and his statutory
right to indictment by grand jury. By permitting a reviewing
court to sustain a conviction for embezzlement after a jury has
101. H.B. 1454, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Mar. 19, 2003,
ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp.
2003))).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
[Vol. 38:13
RETHINKING THEFT CRIMES IN VIRGINIA
found a defendant guilty of larceny, the 2003 amendment violates
a defendant's right to trial by jury.
A. The Court of Appeals in Bruhn Warned of Constitutional
Problems
The opinion of the en banc court of appeals in Bruhn contains a
clear constitutional warning: "In Virginia, proof of the elements of
a crime not alleged in an indictment will not support a convic-
tion .... [Olur constitutions demand that the Commonwealth in-
dict for the crime it intends to prosecute.""'5 The court of appeals
based its opinion on the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which collectively guar-
antee criminal defendants the right to be informed of the "nature
and cause of the accusation,"' 6 and on Article I, section 8 of the
Virginia Constitution which establishes an equivalent right un-
der state law.10 7 The court's warning applies directly to the proce-
dure that the General Assembly adopted in its 2003 amendment
to the embezzlement statute. The process now allowed by the
amendment is exactly the process that the Bruhn court found un-
constitutional.'
The statement of the court of appeals in Bruhn was not new or
unique to Virginia law. For decades the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has sounded the same theme. "It is firmly established," the
court has written, "that an accused cannot be convicted of a crime
that has not been charged, unless the crime is a lesser-included
offense of the crime charged."' 9 Bruhn is merely the most recent
in a series of cases in which Virginia courts have applied this
105. Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. at 541, 559 S.E.2d at 882. In affirming the
court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled simply that the Code of
Virginia no longer allows proof of embezzlement to sustain a charge of larceny. Common-
wealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. at 602-03, 570 S.E.2d at 868-69. Because of its interpretation of
the embezzlement statute, the court never reached constitutional issues. See id.
106. Bruhn, 37 Va. App. at 541, 559 S.E.2d at 882 (citing United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 557-58 (1875)).
107. Id.
108. Compare id., with Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cure. Supp. 2003)).
109. Commonwealth v. Dalton, 259 Va. 249, 253, 524 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2000).
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principle where indictments alleged one theft crime but proof at
trial established a different offense. 110
B. The 2003 Amendment Violates the Right to be Informed of the
"Nature and Cause" of a Criminal Charge
The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants the right "to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.""' By vir-
tue of the Fourteenth Amendment, that federal right applies in
state prosecutions.'12 In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, an
indictment must meet three requirements.1 1 3 First, the indict-
ment must adequately serve a "notice" function. It must "furnish
the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defence [sic].""' Second, the indict-
ment must serve a "double jeopardy" function. It must plead an
offense in a manner that will support a double jeopardy plea if
the same defendant is later tried for the same crime."5 Third, the
indictment must satisfy a "judicial review" function. It must set
forth the elements "to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a con-
viction.""' 6 By allowing a defendant to face trial without clear no-
tice of the elements of his alleged crime, the 2003 amendment
110. See Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. at 540, 559 S.E.2d at 882; Gardner v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 18, 25, 546 S.E.2d 686, 690 (2001) (holding that evidence was in-
sufficient because of a variance in the indictment and proof); Baker v. Commonwealth, 225
Va. 192, 194, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983) (stating that the jury instruction was improper
because it did not address title to the property taken, and focused only on possession
which does not encapsulate all of larceny by false pretenses); Owalbi v. Commonwealth, 16
Va. App. 78, 81, 428 S.E.2d 14, 16 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence was insufficient
to prove the value of stolen credit cards).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 (1972).
113. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557-58 (1875). For a summary of
the constitutional doctrines addressing the functions and sufficiency of indictments, see
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS
983-86 (10th ed. 2002).
114. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
115. KAMISAR, supra note 113, at 984. Even before the 2003 amendment, there were
complex double jeopardy issues inherent in the retrial of a defendant on a new theft
charge after he had been acquitted of a different kind of theft involving the same property.
Arguably, the 2003 amendment will further disadvantage prosecutors in this regard. A
defendant tried for larceny after the 2003 amendments can argue plausibly that he has
been "in jeopardy" for embezzlement as well, because the amendment would allow convic-
tion for embezzlement upon a charge of larceny.
116. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
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fails the "notice" test. By allowing a reviewing court to sustain a
conviction that was never rendered by the fact finder at trial, it
fails the "judicial review" test as well.
1. The Notice Function
In one respect, at least in some cases, an indictment that al-
leges larceny of specific property would seem to give an accused
adequate notice to defend against a claim that he embezzled the
same property. After all, one might argue, he is informed of the
time and place of the offense, the property at issue, and that he is
accused of stealing it. Whether he stole from the victim's posses-
sion or after obtaining lawful possession should matter little. 117
This view of an indictment's "notice" function, however, misses
a fundamental point. In addition to providing "factual notice"-
orienting a defendant to the time, place, and basic facts of a
crime-an indictment also provides a kind of "legal notice." It
serves to identify the legal components or "elements" of the crime
as well.1 ' Justice Thomas put the matter succinctly in Apprendi
v. New Jersey:"9
In order for an accusation of a crime (whether by indictment or some
other form) to be proper under the common law, and thus proper un-
der the codification of the common-law rights in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, it must allege all elements of that crime.
120
That kind of legal notice is essential to allow defense counsel to
do her job. The legal elements of an offense typically inform de-
fense counsel's major choices in preparing and trying a criminal
case: from the witnesses she chooses to call (or even to interview),
to the exhibits she offers or opposes, to the pretrial motions she
files, to the opening statement or closing argument she delivers.
An indictment that fails to specify the elements of an offense or,
117. This was the view of Justice Moncure in responding to defendant's "notice" claims
in Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 593-97 (1873) (Moncure, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that jury instructions should be propounded when offenses are so intertwined
only if there is at least a slight basis in law for the instruction).
118. Several Supreme Court of the United States' decisions highlight this function by
insisting that an indictment include the legal "ingredients" or "elements" of an offense.
See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
119. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
120. Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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worse yet, specifies one set of elements but allows them to change
mid-trial, can confound defense counsel at each of those steps.'2 '
It is not enough, therefore, to suggest that under the 2003
amendment a defendant is on notice that an indictment alleging
the elements of larceny means, for practical purposes, that he is
simultaneously charged with embezzlement as well. That ap-
proach may make sense where the crime ultimately proved is a
lesser-included offense within the crime alleged. After all, in such
circumstances a defendant was on notice before trial that he must
meet all of the elements ultimately proved. But the situation is
far different in the case of larceny and embezzlement. The ele-
ments of the two crimes are different and-in one critical re-
spect-mutually contradictory.'22 Defending against one can
mean conceding an element of the other. Under such circum-
stances it is manifestly unfair to tell a defendant: "Go to trial
now, and we'll choose the elements of the crime after you've com-
pleted your defense."
2. The Judicial Review Function
One of the essential checks and balances in the American
criminal justice system is a division of labor between factfinder
and legal arbiter. Juries-or judges in bench trials-determine
the facts from evidence presented at trial and render a verdict
based on those facts. At several steps along the way, however,
judges impose limits on that factfinding process. Before trial, a
judge reviews the indictment or information to insure that the
facts alleged amount to a crime. The trial judge, in considering a
motion to set aside the verdict, must determine if the facts proved
at trial are sufficient as a matter of law to support a factfinder's
verdict. On appeal, an appellate court performs a similar func-
tion. The "nature and cause" clause of the Sixth Amendment pre-
121. It was this kind of unfairness which concerned the Court of Appeals of Virginia in
Bruhn. See Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537, 542, 559 S.E.2d 880, 883 (Ct. App.
2002) (en banc) (noting that "throughout his trial, Bruhn defended a charge of grand lar-
ceny... [and] presented evidence.., that there had been no trespassory taking' of the
property.... Clearly, the indictment did not provide Bruhn sufficient notice to adequately
prepare to defend the accusations (of embezzlement now] made against him.").
122. A defendant who commits a trespassory taking from the victim's possession, and
therefore is potentially guilty of larceny, has not been lawfully entrusted with the prop-
erty, and therefore could not be guilty of embezzlement. See supra Part II.A.
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serves the division of labor essential to that system of checks and
balances by insuring that the reviewing court is considering the
same charge that the factfinder considered.123 Indeed, some com-
mentators suggest this is the primary justification for a constitu-
tional rule requiring that a formal criminal charge must identify
all elements of the offense.'24
The 2003 amendment to Virginia's embezzlement statute vio-
lates this basic principle when it provides that "[p1roof of embez-
zlement shall be sufficient to sustain the charge of larceny."25
The reason is simple; on a motion to set aside the verdict or on
appeal, the amended statute would allow a reviewing court to
sustain an embezzlement verdict that was never rendered by the
factfinder.
12 6
C. The 2003 Amendment Violates the Right to Trial by Jury
For essentially the same reasons, the 2003 amendment can vio-
late a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.'27 The
problem will arise where a defendant convicted of larceny by a
jury moves to set aside the verdict and then appeals on the famil-
iar ground that the evidence is insufficient to support proof of
"trespassory taking" from the victim's "possession. "128 The 2003
amendment would permit the Commonwealth to argue, as it did
in Bruhn,'29 that proof of embezzlement-where "entrustment,"
rather than trespassory taking is the distinguishing element-is
"sufficient to sustain the charge." 3 ° But, under these circum-
123. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
124. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 113, at 984.
125. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
126. The Supreme Court of Virginia already has found this type of procedure unconsti-
tutional. In Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 300 S.E.2d 788 (1983), the court cited
Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution and held that, "[t]he Commonwealth can-
not retrospectively argue that Baker should be convicted of a crime for which he was not
prosecuted, and on which the jury was not instructed." Id. at 194-95, 300 S.E.2d at 789.
127. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury.... ."). The Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial applies in state prosecutions as well, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
128. The Bruhn appeal raised the same argument, but the case had been tried without
a jury. Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. 597, 600, 570 S.E.2d 866, 867-68 (2002).
129. See id. at 601-02, 570 S.E.2d at 868-69.
130. See Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
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stances, no jury would have found the element of "entrustment"
beyond a reasonable doubt. In effect, the 2003 amendment allows
appellate courts to "sustain" proof of an element never considered
by a jury. That process stands in clear violation of recent pro-
nouncements by the Supreme Court of the United States, holding
that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury means that a jury
must find every element of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.131
D. The 2003 Amendment Violates the Statutory Right to a Grand
Jury Indictment in Felony Cases
There is no constitutional right to a grand jury indictment in a
Virginia prosecution.132 By statute, however, Virginia law pro-
vides that "no person shall be put upon trial for any felony, unless
an indictment or presentment shall have first been found or made
by a grand jury."1 33 The statute essentially tracks the language of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 3 1 which
creates a similar right in federal prosecutions. 35
The 2003 amendment violates a Virginia defendant's grand
jury right when it allows conviction for a felony for which a de-
fendant was never indicted. 36 That is exactly what occurs when a
defendant indicted for larceny is ultimately convicted of the sepa-
rate crime of embezzlement. Unless a grand jury indicts him for
CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
131. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602-03 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 477 (2000); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
132. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 495, 504, 525 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App.
2000) ("[Olne accused of a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth has no constitutional
right to indictment by a grand jury.").
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
134. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
135. The right to grand jury indictment is among the few guarantees in the Bill of
Rights which has never been applied to state prosecutions through the Supreme Court's
doctrine of "selective incorporation." See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35
(1884); see also JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION
535 (2003 ed.).
136. Although there is no Virginia decision directly on point, decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, interpreting the identical grand jury provision of the Fifth
Amendment, are instructive. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16
(1960) ("[A]fter an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened
through amendment except by the grand jury itself.").
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embezzlement, the statute prohibits his trial-and therefore his
conviction-for embezzlement.
13 1
One could argue that, under the 2003 amendment, a grand jury
charge of larceny is really a "generic" form of theft allegation that
implicitly includes a charge of embezzlement as well. After all,
the statute now says that a defendant who commits embezzle-
ment "may be indicted as for larceny."13 That argument fails,
however, for reasons I have already identified. Larceny and em-
bezzlement of the same property by the same defendant cannot
coexist in the same charge. The crimes are contradictory and mu-
tually exclusive. 139 Larceny requires an unlawful taking from the
victim's possession, while embezzlement requires lawful receipt
from the victim.14 ° It is literally impossible for a grand jury to find
probable cause of both crimes at once. The grand jury right exists
in Virginia law, as it does in the Fifth Amendment, in order to
protect defendants from criminal charges not based on probable
cause as found by a neutral body of citizens. 4' If we construe a
larceny indictment to support an embezzlement charge, then we
have abandoned the very reason for having a grand jury indict-
ment in the first place.
137. The 2003 amendment to Virginia's embezzlement statute appears to contemplate
trial on a larceny indictment followed by conviction for embezzlement, but without
amendment of the indictment. See Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts - (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). Virginia Code Section
19.2-231 allows for the amendment of indictments "provided the amendment does not
change the nature or character of the offense charged." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-231 (Repl.
Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003). Though there is no Virginia case directly on point, it seems
likely that any attempt to amend a larceny indictment to allege an element-
entrustment-that is the opposite of an element found by the grand jury-trespassory tak-
ing-would change the nature and character of the offense. Cf. Wilson v. Commonwealth,
31 Va. App. 495, 508, 525 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2000) (permitting amendment which
merely "narrowed the scope of the indictment" by striking out one of several allegations
phrased in the disjunctive). In any event, unlike the procedure contemplated by the 2003
amendments to the embezzlement statute, the amendment provision in Virginia Code sec-
tion 19.2-231 applies only before the verdict, provides for a new arraignment on the
amended charge, and allows for a continuance where the amendment might prejudice the
defense. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-231 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
138. VA. CODE ANN. 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
141. "The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to
limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independ-
ently of either prosecuting attorney or judge." Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218.
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E. An Election Provision Would Only Partially Solve the Problem
For seventy-five years, Virginia theft law included a provision
requiring prosecutors, upon demand by the defense, to specify the
theft crime which the Commonwealth intended to prove at
trial.'42 The 2003 General Assembly considered, but ultimately
discarded, an identical election procedure.143
An election procedure would have solved at least some of the
constitutional shortcomings identified above.1" Nevertheless, it is
far from a perfect solution. Competent defense counsel will al-
most always demand an election. In that circumstance, prosecu-
tors still face the familiar historic dilemma of choosing the right
theft offense at the risk of losing a conviction. And where defense
counsel fails to demand an election, his failure may open up a
new round of post-conviction litigation over ineffective assistance
of counsel.'45
142. The General Assembly added the election provision in 1919, then removed it in
1994 at the same time it removed the provision allowing proof of embezzlement to sustain
a larceny conviction. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 4451 (1919), with Act. of Apr. 9, 1994, ch.
555, 1994 Va. Acts 776 (formerly codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Repl.
Vol. 1996)); see also supra Part III.B.
143. The original version of House Bill 1454 included no election provision. H.B. 1454,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003). The Senate amended the bill and passed a version
that included an election right. The election provision was removed by a conference com-
mittee, resulting in a final version of House Bill 1454 which contained no election provi-
sion. See H.B. 1454, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Mar. 19, 2003,
ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp.
2003))).
144. By clearly identifying the charge before trial, an election procedure would satisfy
the notice and judicial review functions of the Sixth Amendment "nature and cause"
clause. Allowing a jury instruction on all of the elements of the ultimate crime of convic-
tion would prevent infringement upon the defendant's right to a jury trial. Although an
election provision would not address the right to be tried only on felonies indicted by the
grand jury, one might argue that it would create a statutory exception to the right. Argua-
bly, the addition of an election procedure to the embezzlement statute in 1919 resulted
from the legislature's recognition that it was unfair to require a defendant to face trial
without knowing the elements of his alleged offense. The election procedure probably pro-
tected the statute from constitutional challenge in most cases, except where the Common-
wealth elected one form of theft and later argued that the evidence proved a different
crime. See, e.g., Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 194-95, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983).
145. While the Sixth Amendment allows defense counsel wide latitude in exercising
professional judgment as demonstrated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96
(1984), there are few cases where there would be a valid strategic reason for failing to ask
a prosecutor to specify the charge before trial.
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V. CONSOLIDATING THEFT CRIMES: GETTING TO THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE PROBLEM
In fairness to our English forebears, we should acknowledge
the necessities which led to the complex tangle of theft offenses
which now characterize Virginia law. Common law judges built
these doctrines one case at a time. Sometimes they bent prece-
dent or "deemed" elements to exist in order to prevent an obvi-
ously guilty thief from escaping justice. 46 In an age where all
felonies were punishable by death, sometimes they contracted the
definition of "felony" where a petty crime might otherwise lead to
the gallows.'47 Occasionally Parliament stepped in to fill gaps in
response to public disapproval of a judicial decision. 4 8 Each
step-perhaps-may have made sense at the time. But, like an
old lawn mower strapped together with baling wire and patched
with duct tape, no one would have built it that way from the
start.
While English history can explain the subtle boundaries that
separate theft offenses, almost no one claims that those distinc-
tions serve any purpose in the modern age.'49 It should not matter
whether I loan my car to a thief who already has decided to steal
it or to one who reaches that decision moments after she sits in
the driver's seat. If a crook uses a phony identity to take my mer-
chandise, it should not matter whether the small print of the fi-
nancing agreement leaves me with title. Over a hundred years
ago, an early Virginia advocate of theft consolidation wrote that
larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses "differ only in a few
circumstantial details, immaterial in a moral point of view. They
all amount to a criminal and fraudulent conversion by one man to
his own use of another man's property."'5 ° In terms of a defen-
146. See Rex v. Chisser, 83 Eng. Rep. 142, 142-43 (K.B. 1678). Chisser is among the
early cases that extended the reach of larceny through the legal fiction of 'constructive
possession." See supra Part II.
147. "The severity of this penalty not only made the judges reluctant to enlarge feloni-
ous larceny but also may account for the host of artificial limitations that they engrafted
on the offense...." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1, cmt. 2, at 129 (Proposed Official Draft
1980).
148. The creation of the separate offenses of false pretenses in 1757 and embezzlement
in 1799 are the prime examples. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49, 56-60.
149. "The distinction [between embezzlement and larceny], now largely obsolete, did
not ever correspond to any essential difference in the character of the acts or in their effect
upon the victim." Van Vechten v. Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 146 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1925).
150. Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 581 (1873) (Moncure, J., dissent-
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dant's moral culpability, his dangerousness, or the loss he causes
to his victim, there is no sensible reason to distinguish among the
offenses."'
Because the archaic distinctions among theft offenses serve no
purpose other than to confound prosecutors, most jurisdictions
have abandoned them. The criminal codes of most American
states discarded the distinctions over the last half century. 2 The
federal criminal code penalizes theft of federal property without
regard to the narrow distinctions among traditional theft of-
fenses.'53 The Model Penal Code consolidates not only larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses into the offense of "theft," but
receiving stolen property, extortion, and blackmail as well.' In
an ironic twist, the English themselves consolidated larceny, em-
bezzlement, and false pretenses into the crime of "theft" more
than thirty years ago.'55
Rather than pursuing failed efforts to address the muddle of
theft crimes through procedural devices, Virginia should choose
the best from these many examples and address the real problem
directly. The Commonwealth should simplify its substantive law
by eliminating the separate crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and
false pretenses, and replacing them with the single offense of
"theft." Most importantly, the change must be more than cos-
metic: more than a change of labels that merely "deems" various
offenses to be "larceny" without changing the elements of the of-
fenses. The key to successful consolidation is to eliminate the
elements that distinguished the traditional offenses-the ele-
ments which make no difference from a moral standpoint and
serve only to complicate prosecution. In essence, that means
eliminating the crime of false pretense by making passage of title
irrelevant. That means eliminating the distinction between lar-
ing).
151. The moral equivalence of the three theft offenses accounts for the near-universal
trend to treat them the same for purposes of punishment. Virginia does exactly that.
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (grand larceny) and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-96 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003) (petit larceny), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
111 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (embezzlement) and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Cum. Supp. 2003)
(false pretenses).
152. See Bartram, supra note 6, at 251 n.23.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).
154. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.1 to -223.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1980).
155. The English Theft Act of 1968 defines the crime as follows: "A person is guilty of
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of
permanently depriving the other of it." Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 1(1) (Eng.).
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ceny and embezzlement by making entrustment irrelevant. The
best way to achieve that change is to eliminate those traditional
offenses altogether, and to replace them with a single new offense
with simpler elements. The basic elements of theft are: (1) obtain-
ing the property of another; (2) with the intention of depriving
another of property; and (3) with no honest claim of right to the
property. The basic definition of "theft" should say so; and it need
say no more.
I will not pretend that the change will be as simple as that. The
term "larceny," along with the historical baggage it carries, is
sprinkled throughout the Code of Virginia."6 It will take a pains-
taking review of those related crimes to ensure a smooth transi-
tion. But the benefits of theft consolidation are obvious, and the
time is ripe for change. The events of the last year-the Bruhn
decision and the legislative response-point out the need for a
broader solution than the procedural fixes that have failed in the
past. The Crime Commission has already begun a comprehensive
review of the criminal code.157 It should put theft consolidation at
the top of its list of priorities.
VI. CONCLUSION
For more than a century, Virginia has made unsuccessful at-
tempts to achieve a kind of theft consolidation through procedural
means. Those attempts have failed because they conflict with
procedural rights guaranteed by the constitutions of Virginia and
the United States. The General Assembly's latest effort to amend
the embezzlement statute is merely more of the same, and it is
doomed to failure for the same reason. In the end, the problems
we inherited from our English ancestors cannot be solved by de-
manding that a defendant face trial without knowing the ele-
ments of his alleged crime. The arcane subtleties of English com-
mon law cannot be erased simply by "deeming" one hard-to-define
crime to be a different hard-to-define crime. The problem lies in
the definitions themselves.
156. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-104 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (punishing recidivism); id. §
18.2-114.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (punishing commissioners who fail to account for receipts); id.
§ 18.2-115 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003) (criminalizing the fraudulent conversion
of property subject to lien); id. § 18.2-181 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003) (punishing
those who write bad checks).
157. See H.J. Res. 687, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
20031

